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Punitive Damages and the Deceased
Tortfeasor: Should Pennsylvania Courts
Allow Punitive Damages to be Recovered
from a Decedent's Estate?
I. Introduction
Recently, two Pennsylvania trial courts faced the question of
whether punitive damages' may be recovered from a deceased
tortfeasor's estate.2  In the absence of appellate authority on this
subject,3 these courts reached different conclusions on the issue.
I. Punitive or exemplary damages are damages awarded to a plaintiff in excess of the actual
harm suffered by the plaintiff. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984). Punitive damages are generally imposed to punish a defendant
for his outrageous conduct See, e.g., Creed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 A.2d 10, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) ("Clearly, the nature of punitive damage awards is designed to punish an individual litigant
for misconduct ...."). In addition, many courts impose punitive damages not only to punish the
defendant but also to serve as an example to others to deter the commission of outrageous acts.
See, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977); Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 470
A.2d 475 (Pa. 1983). A minority of jurisdictions also view punitive damages as a means to
compensate a plaintiff for remote damages such as attorney's fees. See, e.g., Hofer v. Lavender,
679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
The concept of imposing civil punishment in the form of damages dates back to ancient
times. James B. Sales and Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived
Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1119 (1984) [hereinafter Sales & Cole]. Some authorities
trace the origins of punitive damages back to the Code of Hammurabi of 2000 B.C. Id. In fact,
some Biblical passages call for the imposition of punitive damages in cases of theft. See, e.g.,
Exodus 22:1 (King James) ("If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he shall
restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.") (cited in Sales & Cole, supra, at 1119).
The origins of punitive damages in the common law are traced to the 1600s, when English
courts upheld jury verdicts that exceeded the plaintiff's actual damages. Sales & Cole, supra, at
1120. In 1763 an English court first employed the term "exemplary damages" in observing that
a jury could render a verdict in excess of the plaintiff's actual damages. Id. An American court
first addressed the issue of punitive damages in Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 77 (1791). Id. at
1124. In Coryell, the court charged the jury to "give damages for example's sake, to prevent such
offenses in future." Id.
2. Teamsters and Chauffeurs Fed. Credit Union v. Estate of Long, 42 Cumb. L.J. 155
(1992); Schwab v. Bates, 73 West. L.J. 107 (1991).
3. In Mohler v. Worley, 116 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955), the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that when an injured plaintiff dies before trial for reasons unconnected to the
defendant's negligent act, a recovery for lost wages is limited to the period between injury and
death. Id. at 345. Although punitive damages were not at issue, the court stated in dicta that "the
death of the tortfeasor terminates liability for punitive damages." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 926(b) (1939)).
For a discussion on the related issue of whether punitive damages may be recovered if the
plaintiff dies, see Harvey v. Hassinger, 461 A.2d 814, 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (stating that
decedent's estate may recover punitive damages in survival action if plaintiff could have recovered
them had she lived); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claim for Punitive Damages in Tort Action as
Surviving Death of Tortfeasor or Person Wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707, 714 (1984).
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In Schwab v. Bates4 the Westmoreland County Court of Common
Pleas held that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a
deceased tortfeasor's estate when the conduct involved is driving while
intoxicated.' Within a year of the Schwab decision, the Cumberland
County Court of Common Pleas held in Teamsters and Chauffeurs
Federal Credit Union v. Estate of Long6 that punitive damages may not
be recovered from a decedent's estate when the wrongful conduct
involved is conversion of funds.7
In light of this divergence of authority, this Comment addresses the
issue of whether Pennsylvania courts should allow, punitive damages to
be recovered from a deceased tortfeasor's estate. Part II of this
Comment examines the view in the minority of jurisdictions that have
allowed punitive damages to be recovered from a deceased tortfeasor's
estate. Part III discusses the majority rule, which prohibits the recovery
of punitive damages from a decedent's estate. Part IV discusses the
general policy that Pennsylvania courts have adopted regarding the
imposition of punitive damages and recommends that Pennsylvania not
allow punitive damages to be assessed against a deceased tortfeasor's
estate.
II. Minority View: Punitive Damages are Recoverable from a
Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate
Numerous jurisdictions have faced the question of whether punitive
damages should be recoverable from a deceased tortfeasor's estate.8
However, at present only three jurisdictions allow the recovery of
4. 73 West. L.J. 107 (1991).
5. Id. In Schwab, the plaintiffs were injured in an automobile collision with the defendant.
Id. Alleging that the decedent was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident, the
plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages from the decedent's estate in their
complaint. Id. The defendant filed a preliminary objection to the claim for punitive damages,
asserting that the decedent's estate should not be liable in punitive damages for the conduct of the
decedent. Id. The court denied the preliminary objection, but expressly stated that its holding was
limited to instances when the decedent has injured a party by driving while intoxicated. Id. at 110.
6. 42 Cumb. L.J. 155 (1992).
7. In Teamsters, the plaintiff credit union alleged that the decedent intentionally converted
funds while employed as an office manager by the plaintiff. 42 Cumb. L.J. 155 (1992). After the
decedent's death, the plaintiff discovered the alleged conversion and filed a complaint seeking
compensatory and punitive damages from the decedent's estate. Id. at 156. The court sustained
the defendant's preliminary objection, holding that punitive damages may not be recovered from
a decedent's estate. Id. at 159. In reaching its holding, the court relied extensively on a Florida
supreme court decision, Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988). See 42 CUMB. L.J. at 157-59.
For a discussion of Lohr, see infra notes 77-108 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 9-12, 44-70 and accompanying text.
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punitive damages after the tortfeasor's death: West Virginia,9
Texas,'" and Alabama." A fourth jurisdiction, New Hampshire,
appears to fall into this category as well.' 2
West Virginia's highest court held in Perry v. Melton 3 that
punitive damages are recoverable from a decedent's estate.'4 The
court observed that in West Virginia, punitive damages serve not only
as punishment to the wrongdoer, but also as additional compensation to
the plaintiff. 5 Moreover, the court argued that punitive damages serve
to deter potential tortfeasors from engaging in tortious conduct.' 6
Relying on the reasoning in Perry, the Texas Supreme Court held
in Hofer v. Lavender7 that punitive damages could be recovered from
a deceased tortfeasor's estate.' 8 In Hofer, the court noted that a split
of authority existed in other jurisdictions and decided that resolution of
the issue depended upon the jurisdiction's rationale for assessing
punitive damages. '" Examining the rationale behind imposing punitive
damages in Texas, the court noted that earlier Texas decisions had
recognized punitive damages as serving to compensate plaintiffs for
remote losses such as inconvenience and attorney's fees.20 Like the
Perry court, the Hofer majority also argued that the imposition of
punitive damages on a decedent's estate would deter potential
tortfeasors from engaging in outrageous conduct.2' The court
concluded that since Texas recognized deterrence and compensation as
additional functions of punitive damages, such damages should be
recoverable against a decedent's estate.22
9. Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
10. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984) (5-4 decision).
11. See Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977) (predicting Alabama law).
12. See Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978).
13. 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 12 (citing Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981)).
16. Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 12.
17. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984) (5-4 decision).
18. Id. For a detailed discussion of Hofer, see Jack W. Collier, Note, Recovery of Exemplary
Damages from the Estate of a Deceased Tortfteasor, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 389 (1986) (criticizing
Hofer as judicial legislation), and Scott A. Hennis, Note, Recovery of Exemplary Damages from
the Estate of a Tortfeasor is Permitted Under the Texas Survival Statute, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 731
(1985) (praising Hofer).
19. 679 S.W.2d at 473.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 475. Hofer overruled Wright's Adm'x. v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291 (1870), which
prohibited recovery of punitive damages from a deceased tortfeasor's estate.
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Four justices dissented in Hofer, observing that no damages were
actually sought or awarded as punishment.23 The dissent noted that
the jury instruction requested by the plaintiff and given at trial described
exemplary damages as being for purposes of deterrence only.24 No
mention of the punitive purpose of such damages was made in the jury
charge.25 The dissent then argued that "the punitive and deterrent
aims of exemplary damages are not separable . . . . When, through
death, the tortfeasor is no longer subject to legal punishment, the
general deterrent effect likewise is greatly diminished, if not completely
frustrated."26  The dissent warned that the majority's willingness to
separate the punitive and deterrent functions of punitive damages
creates the possibility of a double recovery because a plaintiff could
seek one jury instruction calling for a punitive award to punish and
another charge instructing the jury to award damages to serve as an
example to others.27 The dissent did not, however, address the
majority's contention that punitive damages serve a compensatory
function.2"
In Ellis v. Zuck,29 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted
that Alabama law would allow recovery of punitive damages from a
deceased tortfeasor's estate.3°  Although the Supreme Court of
Alabama had previously stated that punitive damages could not be
recovered from an estate,3 ' the Ellis court rejected this statement as
dictum.32 Instead, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Alabama Supreme
Court's ruling in Shirley v. Shirley3 that a wrongful death action may
be brought against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. 34  The Ellis court
reasoned that since all damages recoverable under Alabama's wrongful
death statute are punitive damages, the Shirley decision permitted the
recovery of punitive damages from a decedent's estate.35 In addition,
23. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 477 (Tex. 1984) (Spears, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 478.
27. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. 1984) (Spears, J., dissenting).
28. See id.
29. 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. Id.
31. See Meigham v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 51 So. 775, 777-778 (Ala. 1910)
("Exemplary damages are in no case a right of the plaintiff, but are assessed at the discretion of
the jury for the purpose indicated; and when the wrongdoer dies before the action survives against
his personal representative, only compensatory damages may be recovered.").
32. Ellis, 546 F.2d at 644.
33. 73 So.2d 77 (Ala. 1954).
34. Ellis, 546 F.2d at 644. See Shirley, 73 So.2d at 85.
35. 546 F.2d at 644. But see Charles W. Burton, Comment, Punishing the Dead: Whether
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the court reasoned that recovery of punitive damages from a decedent's
estate is proper since Alabama also recognizes that punitive damages
provide "deterrents to others similarly situated from taking steps of the
character condemned." 36
Finally, whether New Hampshire should be considered a
jurisdiction which allows the recovery of punitive damages from a
deceased tortfeasor's estate is the subject of some debate." Although
New Hampshire case law technically does not permit a plaintiff to
recover punitive damages under any circumstances,"3 New Hampshire
courts allow the plaintiff to recover liberal compensatory damages if a
defendant has exhibited wanton or malicious conduct.39 In Munson v.
Raudonis4" the Supreme Court of New Hampshire allowed such
damages to be recovered from a decedent's estate because they serve
entirely as compensation to the plaintiff and are not meant to punish the
defendant.4
III. Majority View: Punitive Damages are not Recoverable from a
Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate
Except for the four states previously noted,42 every jurisdiction
which has addressed the issue presently prohibits the imposition of
punitive damages on a deceased tortfeasor's estate.43 Statutes and case
law support the majority rule in twenty-seven jurisdictions -
Alaska,44  Arizona,45  California,46  Colorado, 47  Florida,48
the Estates of Dead Tortfeasors Should Be Responsible For Punitive Damages, 12 U. ARK. LIrrLE
ROCK L.J. 283, 286 n.14 (1989-90) (arguing that Ellis misconstrued Alabama law).
36. Ellis, 546 F.2d at 645.
37. See Zitter, supra note 4 (listing New Hampshire as jurisdiction allowing recovery of
punitive damages from a decedent's estate); Burton, supra note 34, at 285-86 n.14 (arguing that
New Hampshire should not be considered a jurisdiction which allows recovery of punitive
damages from a decedent's estate).
38. Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972) ("No damages are
to be awarded as a punishment to the defendant or as a warning and example to deter him and
others from committing like offenses in the future. In other words, no damages other than
compensatory are to be awarded.").
39. Id.
40. 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978).
41. Id. at 1178.
42. See supra text surrounding notes 9-12.
43. See infra notes 44-70 and accompanying text.
44. Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 146 (Alaska 1988).
45. Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting punitive damage awards
in actions against decedent's personal representative or successor in interest). See also Bancroft-
Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1966) (holding that publishing company could not
recover punitive damages in a breach of fiduciary duty action against a deceased former company
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Georgia,49  Idaho,50  Iowa,5' Kansas,52  Louisiana,53  Maine,54
Massachusetts,55  Minnesota,56  Mississippi,
57  Missouri,5" Nevada,59
New Mexico, 60  New York, 61 North Carolina,
62  Oklahoma, 63
Oregon,64  Rhode Island, 65  Tennessee,
66  Vermont,67  Virginia 68
president pursuant to CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (repealed 1992)).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101 (1987). See also Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Supp. 359
(D. Colo. 1978) (applying Colorado law).
48. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
49. Morris v. Duncan, 54 S.E. 1045, 1046 (Ga. 1906).
50. IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (1990).
51. Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979); Wolder v. Rahm, 249
N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1977).
52. Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991) (predicting Kansas
law).
53. Johnson v. Levy, 47 So. 422 (La. 1908). In Johnson, the plaintiff sought compensatory
and punitive damages resulting from the defendant's alleged breach of promise to marry. Id. at
422. The plaintiff's father shot and killed the defendant before the action was initiated. Id.
Observing that the defendant "has paid for his transgression with his life," the court held that only
compensatory damages were recoverable from the defendant's estate. Id. at 424.
54. Prescott v. Knowles, 62 Me. 277 (1874).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 230, § 2 (West 1974) (prohibiting punitive damage awards
in tort actions against a decedent's estate). Plaintiffs may recover punitive damages if they have
obtained a judgment before the defendant's death. Wilkins v. Wainwright, 53 N.E. 397 (Mass.
1899).
56. Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
57. MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-235 (1973); Mervis v. Wolverton, 211 So.2d 847 (Miss. 1968).
58. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (predicting Missouri
law).
59. Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487 (Nev. 1977).
60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 761 P.2d 446 (N.M. 1988). In a unanimous
decision, the court rejected the idea that allowing punitive damages to be recovered from a
decedent's estate would serve as a general deterrent to tortious conduct. Id. at 449. Specifically,
the court held that an insurance company may assert that the death of the tortfeasor in order to
avoid liability for punitive damages resulting from the conduct of the deceased tortfeasor. Id. at
452.
61. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2(1) (McKinney 1981).
62. McAdams v. Blue, 164 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968).
63. Morriss v. Barton, 190 P.2d 451 (Okla. 1947) (holding that deceased tortfeasor's estate
is not liable for punitive damages when tortfeasor died after commencement of the cause of action
but before trial).
64. Pearson v. Galvin, 454 P.2d 638 (Or. 1969). See also Ashcraft v. Saunders, 444 P.2d 924
(Or. 1968). In Ashcraft, the court held that a civil statute providing for treble damages could not
be enforced against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. Id. at 927. The court reasoned that a deceased
tortfeasor is "beyond punishment." Id.
65. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-8 (1985).
66. Hayes v. Gill, 390 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. 1965); Paul v. Milburn, 275 F. Supp. 105
(W.D. Tenn. 1967).
67. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1454 (1989).
68. Dalton v. Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 647 (Va. 1963). The court noted that prior case law
prohibited vicarious liability for punitive damages. Id. at 651. Consequently, the court reasoned
that punitive damages could not be imposed on the decedent's estate since this would result in
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Wisconsin,69 and Wyoming.7" The Restatement (Second) of Torts
also espouses the majority opinion.7
The majority position rejects the imposition of punitive damages
on a decedent's estate because a dead person cannot be punished or
deterred.72 As the Mississippi Supreme Court observed, "the realm of
the dead is not invaded, and punishment visited upon the dead."73
Anticipating such an argument, plaintiffs frequently assert that, although
the decedent can be neither punished nor deterred, imposing punitive
damages on a decedent's estate will serve as a general deterrent.74
Courts have consistently rejected this argument.75 As the New Mexico
Court of Appeals argued, "[t]he deterrent effect of punitive damages on
others . . . is inextricably tied to the punishment of the tortfeasor. If the
tortfeasor cannot be punished, it follows that there can be no general
deterrence."76
One of the more thoughtful recent decisions prohibiting the
recovery of punitive damages from a decedent's estate is the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Lohr v. Byrd.77 Bound by
Florida precedent, the Florida Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed the
lower court's award of punitive damages against Lohr's estate.78
Dissatisfied with its holding and considering the issue to be of great
public importance, the court of appeals certified the question for review
by the Supreme Court of Florida.79
The District Court of Appeal reviewed Florida case law and
concluded that punitive damages were recoverable from a decedent's
estate. 0 The court based its decision on the Florida Supreme Court's
holding the decedent's heirs vicariously liable for punitive damages. Id.
69. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.02 (West 1977).
70. Marcante v. Hein, 67 P.2d 196 (Wyo. 1937) (disallowing punitive damages award against
tortfeasor's estate when tortfeasor died after commencement of the cause of action but prior to
trial).
71. "Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor
.... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. a (1979). "[T]he death of the tortfeasor
terminates liability for punitive damages." Id. § 926(b).
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982).
73. Hewlett v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891).
74. See, e.g., Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (D. Kan. 1991).
75. See, e.g., Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 146 (Alaska 1988) ("Since the deceased
tortfeasor cannot be punished, the general deterrent effect becomes speculative at best .... ").
76. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 761 P.2d 446, 449 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
77. 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
78. Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So. 2d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla.
1988).
79. Id. at 140.
80. Id.
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1993
language in Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich.8' In Atlas, the court held
that a claim for punitive damages survived the death of the plaintiff.82
In dictum, the Atlas court stated that a punitive damages claim would
survive the death of the tortfeasor.83 The court of appeals also relied
on Stephens v. Rohde,84 in which another Florida appellate court held
that punitive damages were recoverable against a decedent's estate.85
The Stephens court argued that imposing punitive damages on a
decedent's estate would serve as a deterrent to potential tortfeasors. 86
"[I]f a potential tortfeasor realizes that his estate is liable to
diminishment by punitive damages awards, as is his own purse while
he lives, this provides an additional incentive to avoid tortious
conduct."8'
Although noting that Atlas and Stephens were dispositive of the
issue, the court of appeals found the rationale in Stephens
unconvincing. 8 The court argued that unless the actual wrongdoer is
punished, no deterrent function could be served.89 Moreover, the court
observed that if criminal laws fail to deter a potential tortfeasor, it is
unlikely that the possibility of having a punitive damage award imposed
on one's estate would serve as a meaningful deterrent to engaging in
outrageous conduct.9" The court also observed that the majority of
jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages to be recovered from a
decedent's estate. 9'
In a 4-3 decision written by Justice Overton, the Florida Supreme
Court overturned the court of appeals and held that punitive damages
may not be recovered from a decedent's estate. 92 The majority agreed
with the District Court of Appeal that the language in Atlas was purely
dicta and not controlling. 93 The court further observed that imposing
punitive damages on a decedent's estate would fail to serve a primary
81. 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969).
82. Id. at 688.
83. Id. The court stated that punitive damages should be recoverable "regardless of whether
it is the tortfeasor or the injured party who dies." Id.
84. 478 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 863.
87. Id.




91. Id. at 140.
92. 522 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
93. Id. at 846.
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purpose of punitive damages - punishment - because the tortfeasor
has died.94 The majority also rejected the deterrent rationale advanced
by the court in Stephens.95 Justice Overton stated that "general
deterrence logically depends upon the perception of punishment suffered
by the wrongdoer. 96  Again, the court concluded that a deceased
tortfeasor can perceive no punishment. 97 The majority also agreed
with the lower court that it would be unrealistic to believe that imposing
punitive damages upon an estate would deter potential tortfeasors if the
criminal laws have failed to do so.98
In addition to finding no punitive or deterrent value in allowing
punitive damages against a decedent's estate, the court argued that
allowing such damages would violate public policy.99 The majority
opinion warned that allowing a punitive damages recovery against a
decedent's estate created the possibility that a decedent's widow and
children would be placed on welfare.'00 In addition, the majority
observed that allowing punitive damages would punish not only the
innocent creditors of the decedent's estate, but the decedent's innocent
heirs as well.'0 ' Justice Overton argued that "to punish the innocent
ignores our basic philosophy of justice."' 2  The majority also
observed that "[i]f deterrence is justified in this instance, it would also
be justified to require a decedent's family to pay a fine or be
imprisoned for the decedent's criminal conduct."'0 3
The dissent in Lohr, written by Justice Grimes, argued that
recovery of punitive damages should not be prohibited simply because
the tortfeasor happens to die."'4 The dissent claimed that the deterrent
value of imposing punitive damages is not reduced as a result of the
death of the tortfeasor. 105 Justice Grimes argued, "the warning may
be greater if one knows that even his death will not serve to insulate his
94. Id. at 847.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 846 (quoting Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
97. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So.2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988).
98. Id. at 846 (citing Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
99. See id. at 847.
100. Id.
101. Id. Relying on Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1981)
(holding that employers are not liable for punitive damages unless employer was at fault), the court
reasoned that if an innocent employer is not responsible for punitive damages, an innocent heir
should be treated similarly. Id.
102. Lohr v. Byrd, 822 So.2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988).
103. Id.
104. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1988) (Grimes, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
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estate from liability for his misconduct."' 6  Justice Grimes also
disagreed with the majority's argument that allowing a punitive
damages claim against a decedent's estate would penalize innocent
heirs. ' 7 The dissent noted that if a tortfeasor were to die the day
after a punitive damages judgment was entered against him, his heirs
would suffer punishment.'
IV. Imposition of Punitive Damages in Pennsylvania
Punitive damages have been a feature of Pennsylvania tort law for
roughly two hundred years. 0 9  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard for imposing
punitive damages." 0  Consequently, Pennsylvania courts impose
punitive damages "for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others.'. The court has further explained that punitive damages are
proper "when a person's actions are of such an outrageous nature as to
demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct."
'" 2
This section will argue that imposing punitive damages on the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor is inconsistent with the principles that
have shaped Pennsylvania's punitive damages policy. First,
Pennsylvania can be distinguished from the minority of jurisdictions
which have allowed punitive damages to be recovered from a
decedent's estate. Second, allowing punitive damages to be recovered
from a decedent's estate would conflict with Pennsylvania's punitive




109. See Walker v. Bulz, I Yeates 574 (Pa. 1795). In Walker, the defendant operated a mill
and sought to purchase the plaintiff's meadow, which received water from the mill. Id. at 575.
When the plaintiff failed to sell the meadow to the defendant, the defendant flooded the plaintiff's
land. Id. A large jury verdict was upheld by the court. Id. The court noted that such exemplary
damages were awarded in a similar case. Id.
I10. See Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984).
111. 485 A.2d at 747 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979)). The
Restatement further provides:
In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of
the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
112. SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1991). See also Martin
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1097 (Pa. 1985) ("Punitive damages may not be awarded
for misconduct which constitutes ordinary negligence such as inadvertence, mistake and errors of
judgment.").
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policy rationale for refusing to assess punitive damages against a
deceased tortfeasor's estate.
A. Pennsylvania's Punitive Damages Policy is Inconsistent with the
Imposition of Punitive Damages on a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate
The policy of Pennsylvania courts regarding punitive damages is
founded on three principles. First, the purpose of punitive damages is
to punish and deter."3 Second, punitive damages are not intended as
compensation to the plaintiff."4 Third, punitive damages should not
be imposed upon blameless individuals. "5
1. Punitive Damages Serve to Punish and Deter.-Pennsylvania
courts have been remarkably consistent in holding that the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish and deter the wrongdoer." 6
Accordingly, the courts have ruled that parties may not obtain insurance
against liability for punitive damages." 7  In Esmond v. Liscio," the
113. See infra part IV.A.I.
114. See infra part IV.A.2.
115. See infra part IV.A.3.
116. See, e.g., Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Pa. 1986)
("Unlike compensatory damages, which have as their purpose the desire to make the plaintiff
whole, the purpose of imposing punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoers and to deter future
conduct.") Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) ("In Pennsylvania the
function of punitive damages is to deter... and punish . .. ."); Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 470 A.2d 475, 479 (Pa. 1983) ("[P]unitive damages are 'awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 908(1) (1979)); Creed v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
529 A.2d 10, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("Clearly, the nature of punitive damage awards is designed
to punish an individual litigant for misconduct and such awards are not bodily injury or property
damage awards.").
117. Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). In 1985, the Pennsylvania
legislature created a narrow exception to the prohibition against obtaining insurance coverage for
punitive damages in order to promote the state's downhill skiing industry. 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2051 (1992). Section 2051 provides as follows:
(a) Legislative statement-The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill
skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts
to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the
economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognized that, as in some other sports, there
are inherent risks in the sport of downhill skiing. The law of this Commonwealth being
unclear with regard to the insurability against punitive damages, the operators of
downhill skiing areas face uncertainty in securing insurance to indemnify against
downhill skiing accidents.
(b) Insurability.-It is not against the public policy of this Commonwealth for an
insurance company to insure the operator of a downhill skiing area against punitive
damages, other than those punitive damages arising from an intentional tort committed
by such operator.
(c) Other cases.-Nothing herein contained shall be construed to change or amend
the public policy of this Commonwealth with respect to the insurability against punitive
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Pennsylvania Superior Court reasoned that allowing individuals to
insure against liability for punitive damages "would be to permit such
offenders to purchase a freedom of misconduct .... ", thus detracting
from the deterrent effect of punitive damages. 119 In addition, allowing
an insurance company to pay punitive as well as actual damages would
essentially allow the tortfeasor to remain unpunished. 2 °
Pennsylvania courts have also recognized that the imposition of
punitive damages serves as a general deterrent that discourages others
from committing outrageous acts. 2 ' The Westmoreland County Court
of Common Pleas relied on this general deterrence rationale in Schwab
v. Bates,'22 holding that punitive damages are recoverable from a
decedent's estate.'23 The court in Schwab sought to deter drunk
driving by allowing punitive damages to be recovered from a decedent's
estate when the decedent had engaged in driving while intoxicated.' 24
With the exception of those jurisdictions following the minority
rule, '2 the general deterrence rationale has been rejected in cases
involving a deceased defendant.' 26 As many courts have noted, the
general deterrent effect depends upon the perception that the actual
wrongdoer is punished.'27 When blameless heirs of a tortfeasor are
punished, the deterrent effect is likely diminished if not completely
frustrated. Moreover, the notion that allowing punitive damages to be
recovered from a decedent's estate will serve as a meaningful deterrent
to others is somewhat questionable. A tortfeasor commits an
outrageous act with the constructive knowledge that (1) he may suffer
criminal sanctions such as fines or incarceration; (2) he may be
responsible for compensating the victim; and (3) he could be forced to
damages in cases arising other than from downhill skiing.
118. 224 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).
119. Id. at 799.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1988).
122. 73 WEST. L.J. 100 (1991).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 110.
125. See Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470
(Tex. 1984); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W.Va. 1982). For a discussion of the general
deterrence rationale advanced by the respective courts, see supra text accompanying notes 16, 21,
36. Only New Hampshire has allowed punitive-like damages to be recovered from a decedent's
estate without citing general deterrence as a justification. Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174
(N.H. 1978). This is attributable to New Hampshire's special view of these damages. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-41.
126. E.g., Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982).
127. See, e.g., Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845, 846 (Fla. 1988) (citing Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So.2d
138, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
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pay punitive damages. Thus, a tortfeasor proceeds with the knowledge
that his conduct could result in criminal punishment, compensatory
damage liability, and punitive damage liability. It is difficult to imagine
that an individual who proceeds to act in the face of such knowledge
would suddenly abandon his conduct simply because of the additional
knowledge that punitive damages could also be imposed on his estate.
Because the primary purposes of punitive damages in Pennsylvania
are punishment and deterrence, punitive damages should not be
recoverable from a decedent's estate. As the majority of jurisdictions
have recognized, a deceased tortfeasor can neither be punished nor
deterred. 28  Furthermore, potential tortfeasors are unlikely to be
deterred by the prospect of punitive damage awards against their
estates. 
29
2. Punitive Damages Are Not Intended to Compensate the
Victim.-The courts of Pennsylvania, unlike some jurisdictions, 3 °
have held that punitive damages are not intended to compensate the
victim.' 3 ' The courts' refusal to recognize a compensatory function
of punitive damages is demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's approach to punitive damages in the context of delay damages.
This policy is also evident in the court's willingness to mitigate punitive
damages awards by admitting evidence of any criminal sanctions
suffered by the tortfeasor.
In Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,32 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether delay damages' may
be computed based upon a punitive damages award.' 34 The court
held that the plain language of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
128. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
131. E.g., Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 470 A.2d 475, 479 (Pa. 1983) ("Thus it is
clear that punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries."); Creed
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 A.2d 10, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("Punitive damages are not intended
to compensate the victim but to punish the actor."); Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1966) ("Pennsylvania adheres to the orthodox view that punitive damages are in no
sense intended as compensation to the injured plaintiff.").
132. 470 A.2d 475 (Pa. 1983).
133. The court was applying Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 (1978), which
provided for prejudgment interest often percent from the time the complaint was filed or one year
from the accrual of the action, whichever was later, until the date of the award. PA. R. CIv. P.
238(a) (1978). The rule provided that delay damages could be recovered in cases involving bodily
injury, death, or property damage. Id. In 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a new
rule on delay damages. See PA. R. Civ. P. 238 (1988).
134. Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 470 A.2d 475, 478 (Pa. 1983).
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238 expressly precluded the computation of delay damages based upon
a punitive damages award.'35 The court noted, however, that even if
the language of this rule were ambiguous, delay damages would not be
calculated based upon the punitive damages portion of the
judgment.'36 The court reasoned that Rule 238 served to compensate
the plaintiff by giving him interest on funds to which he was
entitled.3 7  Consequently, the court observed that "[s]ince punitive
damages are intended to punish and not to compensate, they are
irrelevant to the concern underlying Rule 238 that tort victims be fully
compensated for their losses."'38
Pennsylvania's unwillingness to view punitive damages as
compensation to the plaintiff is also reflected in the courts' policy of
allowing the trier of fact to consider any criminal sanctions suffered by
the tortfeasor as a result of his outrageous conduct. In Wirsing v.
Smith, 139 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a punitive
damages award against the defendant for shooting his son-in-law, even
though the defendant was already serving a jail sentence as a result of
this same conduct. 4 The court held that a tortfeasor may suffer both
criminal punishment and punitive damages as a result of his outrageous
conduct.' 4 ' However, the court held that the tortfeasor's conviction
and sentence may be offered into evidence and considered by the fact
finder to mitigate a potential punitive damages award.'42
The Wirsing court apparently concluded that preventing the
excessive punishment of a tortfeasor is more important than a plaintiffs
right to punitive damages. Essentially, a plaintiff's potential punitive
damages recovery can be reduced or eliminated upon the admission of
what is essentially an outside factor - the tortfeasor's criminal
punishment. Consequently, Wirsing exemplifies the court's policy that
punitive damages are in no way to be considered as compensation to the
plaintiff.
135. Id.
136. 470 A.2d at 478.
137. Id. at 479.
138. Id.
139. 70 A. 906 (Pa. 1908).
140. Id. at 909. In Wirsing, the plaintiff ran away with the defendant's daughter and married
her. Id. at 906. Subsequently, the defendant sent the newly married couple a letter expressing his
forgiveness and inviting them to dinner. Id. Upon their arrival at the defendant's home, the
defendant fired four shots at his new son-in-law. Id. at 906.
141. Id. at 909.
142. Id.
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Pennsylvania's refusal to treat punitive damages as compensation
to the plaintiff supports the majority position that punitive damages
should not be recovered from a decedent's estate. As previously noted,
three of the four minority jurisdictions justify their position in part
because they treat punitive damages as compensation to the
plaintiff.'43 Because Pennsylvania courts have expressly rejected the
notion that punitive damages serve a compensatory purpose, a
significant justification underlying the award of punitive damages
against a decedent's estate is absent in Pennsylvania.
3. Punitive Damages Should Not Be Imposed on Blameless
Individuals.-While focusing on the punitive and deterrent aspects of
punitive damages, Pennsylvania courts have also sought to ensure that
punitive damages are not visited upon individuals who are not
responsible for the outrageous conduct. The courts' concern for
blameless individuals is reflected in decisions concerning the imposition
of punitive damages on governmental bodies, successor corporations,
manufacturers, and employers.
(a) Governmental liability for punitive damages.-In
Township of Bensalem v. Press,'4 the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania held that punitive damages may not be recovered from a
municipality. 45 The court considered how other jurisdictions had
handled this issue and noted that only Iowa and New York allowed
punitive damages to be assessed against a municipality.'46 The court
concurred with the majority ofjurisdictions, observing that "the purpose
of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and when that
wrongdoer is a municipality the assessment of punitive damages serves
only to increase taxes . ,14""'7 Consequently, "the effect is merely
to place the burden on the taxpaying public."'48  The court's holding
is essentially based upon the reasoning that innocent taxpayers should
not be liable for punitive damages.
Shortly after Press was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was faced with a similar question in Feingold v. Southeastern
143. See Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d
470 (Tex. 1984); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
144. 501 A.2d 331 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
145. Id. at 338.
146. Id. at 337.
147. Id. at 337.
148. Id. at 338.
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Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. 49 In Feingold, the trial court
assessed punitive damages against the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA). 50  The Pennsylvania Superior
Court reversed, reasoning that punitive damages are not recoverable
against an agency of the Commonwealth such as SEPTA. 5' The
Supreme Court affirmed.'52
In Feingold, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted extensively
from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc.'53 The Feingold court observed that taxpayers
would be forced to bear the costs of any punitive damages award
sustained by a Commonwealth agency.'54 The resulting taxpayer
burden, the court reasoned, must be balanced against the necessity of
punishing the Commonwealth agency.'55 The court held that not
punishing blameless taxpayers is more important than attempting to
punish a state agency. 56  The court stated that "[n]either reason nor
justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the
shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers."157
(b) Punitive damages and successor corporations.-The
propriety of imposing punitive damages on innocent individuals has
been addressed by Pennsylvania courts in the context of successor
corporation liability for punitive damages.5 " In Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., defendant Celotex Corporation argued that it
149. 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986).
150. Id. at 1271.
151. Id. at 1274-75. See Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 488 A.2d 284, 293 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985), afftd, 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986).
152. 517 A.2d at 1277.
153. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). In Newport, the plaintiff sought to recover punitive damages from
a municipality pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id. at 249. The Court held that punitive
damages may not be recovered from a municipality. Id. at 271. The Court observed that
"[p]unitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to
punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and
others from similar extreme conduct." Id. at 266-67.
154. Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1277.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981)).
158. See Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the award of
punitive damages because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently outrageous to justify a punitive damage award. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494
A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
159. 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
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should not be liable in punitive damages for the outrageous conduct of
its predecessor corporation. 160
The Superior Court refused to adopt an all-or-nothing rule
concerning successor corporation liability for punitive damages.
16
1
Instead, the court held that a successor corporation may be liable in
punitive damages for the conduct of its predecessor only when the goals
of punishment and deterrence are served. 162  The court held that the
imposition of punitive damages against a successor corporation may
advance the goals of punishment and deterrence if the "legal change in
corporate identity is not accompanied by major changes in the identity
of the predecessor's shareholders, officers, directors, and management
personnel .... ,,163
However, the court held that if a change in corporate identity was
accompanied by a change in shareholders, officers, and management,
then the successor corporation would not be liable for punitive damages
resulting from the outrageous conduct of its predecessor. 164  The court
reasoned that in such a case, "it would make little if any sense to
impose punitive damages on the successor, for the actors responsible for
the predecessor's reckless misconduct . . . would neither be punished
nor deterred from similar conduct by such an award.' 65  In essence,
the court agreed with Celotex's argument that "there is no policy reason
to punish an innocent party with punitive damages." 1
66
(c) Punitive damages and products liability.-In Martin, the
Superior Court was also faced with the issue of whether to allow
punitive damages to be recovered in a products liability action.
167
The court held that punitive damages are recoverable from the
manufacturer of a defective product. 68  The Martin court expressed
concern that innocent shareholders may be forced to bear the costs of
160. Id. at 661.
161. Id. at 667.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 667.
164. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellee Celotex Corporation). In a footnote, the court stated that
its holding was intentionally imprecise "for we cannot foresee all of the possible configurations
of facts that may arise . . . . The issue of sufficient degree of identity [between predecessor
corporations and successor corporations] is one that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis."
Id. at 667 n.22.
167. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
168. Id. at 666.
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a punitive damages award.' 69  The court conceded that some
shareholders may be completely blameless if they did not own shares
at the time the corporation committed the tortious acts. 70  However,
the court observed that stockholders are not invariably blameless since
"through their selection of a board of directors, the shareholders have
the power to select management.," 7' In addition, the court argued
that allowing punitive damages claims in products liability actions
would serve as a powerful deterrent to reckless business practices.
72
(d) Vicarious liability for punitive damages.-Perhaps the
only context in which Pennsylvania's treatment of punitive damages has
been incongruous with its overall policy is in the area of vicarious
liability for punitive damages. In 1886, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania first held that punitive damages may be imposed on
employers for the tortious acts of their employees. 7' Later courts,
however, have been less than enthusiastic about allowing vicarious
liability for punitive damages. 174  Only two years after articulating this
rule in Rosenzweig, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that
"[t]here may be grave doubts expressed as to the propriety of the rule
.... ,"75 Furthermore, due to the harshness of the rule, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "too great caution cannot be
exercised in permitting the recovery of punitive damages for the willful
or reckless act of a servant not authorized or approved by the
master."1
76
Holding an employer vicariously liable in punitive damages for the
conduct of employees runs counter to the policy underlying punitive
169. Id. at 664.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985). Contra Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (finding that availability of insurance against punitive damages negates
deterrent effect).
173. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Rosenzweig, 6 A. 545 (Pa. 1886). The court offered no
reasoning or explanation for its decision. See id.
174. The Restatement (Second) of Torts position supports employer vicarious liability for
punitive damages under circumstances where the employer was reckless in employing or retaining
the employee or where the employer authorized or ratified the employee conduct. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 909 (1979). However, the Pennsylvania courts have never articulated such
prerequisites to employer vicarious liability for punitive damages. Consequently, under
Pennsylvania law, unlike the Restatement position, an entirely blameless employer may be held
vicariously liable for punitive damages.
175. Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 12 A. 816, 819 (Pa. 1888).
176. Funk v. Kerbaugh, 70 A. 953, 954 (Pa. 1908).
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damages in Pennsylvania. As previously noted, Pennsylvania courts
have consistently stated that the purpose of punitive damages is to
punish and deter.'77 Yet holding an employer vicariously liable for
punitive damages results in the tortfeasor-employee being neither
punished nor deterred. Although Pennsylvania courts are reluctant to
assess punitive damages on blameless individuals,' allowing
vicarious liability for punitive damages can result in the imposition of
punitive damages on an essentially blameless employer.'79
Although allowing vicarious liability for punitive damages seems
to support the concept of holding a blameless heir vicariously liable in
punitive damages for the conduct of the deceased tortfeasor, the
perpetuation of this anomalous rule seems to be based more upon stare
decisis rather than the rationale which underlies the courts' overall
policy on punitive damages. Consequently, the fact that later courts
have criticized and strictly construed this rule of vicarious liability for
punitive damages indicates that Pennsylvania courts likely would not
look favorably upon holding an heir vicariously liable in punitive
damages for the conduct of a decedent.
In light of the concern that Pennsylvania courts have shown for
imposing punitive damages on blameless parties such as state agencies
and successor corporations, it is unlikely that Pennsylvania will allow
punitive damages to be assessed against the innocent heirs and creditors
of a deceased tortfeasor. Only in Martin was the court willing to
impose punitive damages on potentially blameless individuals -
stockholders. 8 ' However, the court observed that not all stockholders
would be blameless'' and that the deterrent value of such awards
would be significant. 182 In contrast, a decedent's heirs and creditors
are entirely blameless for the conduct of the decedent.' 83 In addition,
177. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 144-57, 165-66.
179. Perhaps recognizing this possibility, the Pennsylvania Superior Court appears to have
considered an exception to Pennsylvania's general rule prohibiting insurance coverage of punitive
damages. In Esmond v. Liscio the court observed that
[A]llowing one who is only vicariously liable for punitive damages to shift the burden
of satisfying the judgment to his insurer does not conflict with the rule of policy we
announce today. In such cases, the insured is guilty of no wrongdoing, nor is the award
of punitive damages made to punish him.
224 A.2d 793, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).
180. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
181. Id. at 664.
182. Id. at 665.
183. Had the tortfeasor's heirs or creditors participated in the tortious conduct they likely
would be joined as defendants.
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the general deterrent value of imposing punitive damages on a
decedent's estate is questionable.
8 4
B. Public Policy Considerations
Finally, putting aside any consideration of Pennsylvania's punitive
damages policy, good public policy dictates against allowing punitive
damages to be recovered from a decedent's estate. As the Supreme
Court of Florida observed, "[w]ith the wrongdoer dead, there is no one
to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores our basic philosophy of
justice."'85  In rejoinder to this argument, the Lohr dissent observed
that if a tortfeasor died the day after a punitive damages award was
rendered, innocent heirs would suffer."8 6 However, the Lohr dissent
failed to note a fundamental difference between its hypothetical
proposition and the actual facts in Lohr. In the dissent's hypothetical,
the innocent heirs are forced to bear the burden of the punitive damages
award due to the fortuity of the death of the tortfeasor - an injustice
resulting from an act of fate. In contrast, if the court imposed the
punitive damages on the innocent heirs, it would be the judicial system
which was actively perpetrating the injustice.
V. Conclusion
Two Pennsylvania courts have already faced the issue of whether
to allow punitive damages to be recovered from a decedent's estate. In
Teamster and Chauffeurs Federal Credit Union v. Estate of Long,1
8 7
the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas held that punitive
damages could not be recovered from a decedent's estate.'" In
contrast, the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas has held
that punitive damages may be recovered from a deceased tortfeasor's
estate when the conduct involved is driving while intoxicated. 8 9
Pennsylvania courts should follow the decision in Teamsters and
prohibit the recovery of punitive damages from decedents' estates. The
purposes of punitive damages in Pennsylvania are punishment and
deterrence and neither of these objectives can be served when the
tortfeasor has died. Moreover, allowing punitive damages to be
recovered from a decedent's estate would punish the decedent's
184. See supra notes 74-76, 96-98 and accompanying text.
185. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988).
186. Id. at 848 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
187. 42 Cumb. L.J. 155 (1992).
188. Id.
189. Schwab v. Bates, 73 West. L.J. 107 (1991).
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innocent heirs. Such a result would be inconsistent with Pennsylvania's
reluctance to impose punitive damages on blameless parties. Finally,
aside from any consideration of Pennsylvania's punitive damages
policy, sound public policy dictates that punishment should not befall
blameless individuals.
Paul Minnich

